Longevity Insurance — A Reader’s Guide

Important notice

This guide is a plain-English summary of a technical research paper written for practitioners and regulators. It is consumer information, not personal financial advice. Nothing in this guide should be taken as a recommendation to buy, sell, or continue any financial product. Life insurance and pension decisions depend on personal circumstances and should be discussed with a qualified adviser regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland.

The product this guide describes does not exist in the Irish market today. No Irish insurer currently sells one. The paper specifies the design, prices it, reserves it under Solvency II, and reports what the analysis shows. Its central conclusion is that, although the product is actuarially sound and genuinely valuable to a consumer, it cannot be written on the Solvency II standard formula as designed, because the capital a writing office would have to hold is out of proportion to the margin the contract can generate.

About this edition

Paper MWP-2026-04 has been through several editions. The earlier editions were framed as an "adverse-finding" pricing paper. Version 3.1.0 is a full rewrite and reframes the work as a neutral technical assessment: it reports one positive result and two adverse ones, and takes no commercial position for or against the product. The paper, its four annexes and the companion workbook were subjected to an independent computational audit — full recalculation and independent re-implementation of every production chain — and the corrections are recorded in a consolidated erratum published alongside this edition.

This Reader's Guide is a fresh document for v3.1.0. Earlier Reader's Guides (v1.x) are superseded and should not be relied on for their numbers or conclusions — several headline figures have moved materially between editions.

Contents

1. What this paper is about
2. Why this product was designed
3. How the product would work, step by step
4. The commission models
5. The reference example
6. The headline pricing panel
7. The regulatory picture in plain English
8. The first finding — the product works, and is fair to buy
9. The second finding — the capital requirement, and why it does not close
10. The third finding — the Article 138 longevity calibration
11. The forward look — what could change the conclusion
12. Who this kind of product might suit — and who it would not
13. The disclosure framework
14. A checklist for the informed reader
15. Frequently asked questions
16. Glossary of terms
17. About the author
18. About this paper

At a glance — the v3.1.0 headline

• The paper describes a regular-premium deferred whole-of-life annuity held inside an Approved Retirement Fund (ARF) or vested Personal Retirement Savings Account (PRSA), branded and priced as longevity insurance. Term assurance pays if you die early; this design would pay a lifetime income if you survive to a chosen vesting age. Nothing is paid on death before vesting: premiums forfeited by those who die or lapse early recycle to the survivors — the "mutualisation" that makes the design work.
• The representative case — entry age 65, vesting age 80, a €400,000 fund and a 4% (€16,000-per-year) escalating income — prices at €12,316.07 per year, or about €1,003 per month on a fully monthly basis.
• The pricing works. The pool balances to the cent, earns its intended 3% margin, and at vesting the accumulated fund (€175,975) exceeds the reserve (€169,783). There is no funding shortfall at any point. And the secured income beats the best unsecured drawdown alternative at every age tested — by age 100, €51,059 against €19,060.
• On the consumer side, it fails one fairness test narrowly — and that is fixable. As marketed (with a protection-style commission), the money's-worth ratio is 0.8952 against a 0.90 floor — the premium is €65.84 a year above the maximum fair premium. Re-sizing the sales commission to the product (a 1% trail instead of 5%) restores the ratio to 0.9342, comfortably fair, at a capital cost of about €253 per policy.
• On the capital side, it does not close. Holding Solvency II coverage at every date through the deferral requires about €36,780 of day-one own funds per policy — against a lifetime margin of only €3,913. That is €9.40 of capital for every €1 of margin, or roughly €36.8 million per 1,000 policies behind €12.3 million of annual premium. More than half of it is the Solvency II "risk margin" itself.
• No lever closes the gap, and the two main levers pull against each other: cheaper distribution improves fairness but raises the capital requirement; re-pricing is blocked by the fairness floor; post-vesting longevity reinsurance raises the requirement (€59,179–€73,065 across an 8–12% cost band) and cannot reach the binding point, which sits inside the deferral. The biggest single relief is the 2027 Solvency II reform, which cuts the requirement about 10.7% (to €32,838) — helpful, but far short.
• A separate, product-independent finding: for this kind of liability the standard formula's Article 138 longevity stress delivers only 0.545 of a stochastic 99.5% charge — inadequate in every one of 27 pricing cells tested. The flat 20% stress does the work that a 33% age-weighted stress would.
• The conclusion: the product should not be written as designed — not because it is unsound or unfair, but because the capital needed to carry deferred longevity risk under the standard formula cannot be serviced by the margin such a contract generates. It is fair to buy and prohibitive to write, and the two facts share one cause.

1. What this paper is about

The technical paper MWP-2026-04 defines a life-insurance product most Irish consumers have never seen advertised, because no Irish insurer currently sells one: a regular-premium deferred whole-of-life annuity. In its parts:

• Regular-premium — you would pay a monthly premium for a fixed accumulation period, much as you would for a term-assurance policy.
• Deferred — no income would be paid during the premium-paying years. Income begins only at a chosen vesting date.
• Whole-of-life annuity — once income starts, it is paid every month for as long as you live, with no fixed end date.

The paper calls it "the structural inverse of term assurance." Term assurance is a bet that you might die inside a fixed term; if you do, your family receives a lump sum. This design is the opposite: a bet that you might survive to an advanced age; if you do, you receive a lifetime income. In both, most buyers pay premiums and receive no benefit — and that is precisely the mechanism by which the people who do need the benefit can be paid.

The paper is a working paper, not a product prospectus. It specifies the product, prices it under actuarially defensible assumptions, reserves it under Solvency II, examines the legal and regulatory framework, and reports what it finds. The v3.1.0 edition returns one positive result and two adverse ones, described in sections 8–10 below.

2. Why this product was designed

Since 1999, Irish law has let pension savers keep their retirement funds invested through an Approved Retirement Fund (ARF) or, more recently, a vested PRSA, instead of buying a traditional lifetime annuity. This gave savers freedom and control — but it also transferred a risk that used to be the insurer's onto the individual: the risk of living too long.

An ARF drawing a few per cent a year has a real, non-zero probability of running low before its owner runs out of life. A healthy 65-year-old has a cohort life expectancy of about 24 years on the paper's basis — and a material chance of living well beyond it. Immediate annuities address a related but different problem: they insure the whole of remaining life, starting now, at rates set by today's yields, and they take the fund with them — a trade many 65-year-olds decline.

The gap is at the tail. What has not been available in Ireland is a product that lets a saver pay a modest regular premium in their sixties and seventies, secure a guaranteed lifetime income starting in their eighties, and keep control of their ARF or PRSA in the meantime. That gap is the problem the paper set out to address. Its finding is that the design examined, though sound and valuable, cannot be brought to market under current Solvency II rules — so the gap, for now, remains open. Section 11 sets out the directions that could close it.

3. How the product would work, step by step

The design operates in four phases:

Phase 1 — Application and underwriting. You apply through a regulated adviser and disclose medical and lifestyle information, as for any life policy. The insurer sets terms based on your health at application.

Phase 2 — Accumulation. From the start date to the vesting date you pay a level monthly premium, paid out of the ARF or vested PRSA — from pension assets, not after-tax cash. No income is paid during this phase, and the premium is fixed at outset.

Phase 3 — Vesting. At the vesting date — chosen at outset, ages 75 to 90 — premiums stop and income begins.

Phase 4 — Income for life. From vesting the insurer pays a monthly income for as long as you live. There is no maximum age, no death benefit and no surrender value — a member who dies or lapses before vesting forfeits their premiums to the pool, and those forfeitures subsidise the members who reach vesting. That subsidy is the organising idea. In the representative case the income escalates at 2% a year; the product is single-life, with no dependant's benefit.

The design is deliberately austere: every feature that would add cost or complexity has been removed unless essential.

4. The commission models

Financial products in Ireland can be sold under several commission structures, each of which affects the price to the consumer. The paper prices the product under several in parallel so the effect is visible on every example:

Heaped and trail (the paper's default). 100% of the first year's premium up front, plus a 5% trail on later premiums — the closest analogue to how term assurance is typically sold in Ireland.

Zero commission. No commission; the consumer pays the adviser on a fee basis, or buys through an execution-only or fee-based channel.

Level 20%. 20% of every premium, every year — a comparator rather than common practice.

Industry reference (100/20/3). 100% in year 1, 20% in years 2–4, 3% thereafter — drawn from broader European practice.

The right-sized structure (the paper's recommendation). 100% in year 1 with a 1% trail — a rate the market writes, sized to this product rather than to standalone protection. Section 8 explains why this is the structure that makes the product fair to buy.

5. The reference example

The paper's convention quotes income at €1,000 per month starting at the vesting date. For a healthy 65-year-old choosing a vesting age of 85, the monthly premium is:

Because a fixed euro maintenance cost sits inside each premium, these figures cannot simply be rescaled for a different income. The economic bet is straightforward: you would be paying to insure the risk of living into your late eighties, nineties, or beyond.

The representative case used through the rest of the paper is at full scale: entry 65, vesting 80, a €400,000 fund and a 4% (€16,000-per-year) escalating income, priced at €12,316.07 per year.

6. The headline pricing panel

The paper reports a monthly-premium surface (per €1,000 of monthly income at vesting) across representative entry and vesting ages — a slice of the full 16×16 surface in Annex B. Two patterns dominate:

Later vesting sharply reduces the premium. For a 65-year-old, moving the vesting age from 75 to 90 takes the monthly premium from about €1,362 down to about €106 — the longer the deferral, the less mortality the insurer expects to pay out in aggregate. The bottom-left corner (short deferrals) approaches immediate-annuity territory and is included for completeness, not as a sale point.

Distribution choice is visible. The gap between the "as marketed" and "zero commission" columns is the cost of distribution alone — the subject of the fairness analysis in section 8.

7. The regulatory picture in plain English

Life-insurance products in Ireland sit under several overlapping regimes. The paper finds no launch-blocking legal impediment — but it finds that the prudential framework, under the current Solvency II standard formula, does not support commercial viability of the design.

Solvency II — the capital regime for insurers. The product falls within existing life lines of business; no new authorisation category is needed. Both adverse findings sit inside this regime (sections 9 and 10). Consumer Protection Code 2025 — the product is compatible; standard suitability and information rules apply, and the commission analysis bears directly on them. Insurance Distribution Directive — applies; a formal target-market and product-approval process would be required. PRIIPs — a Key Information Document would be required; the paper notes the standard three-scenario performance format does not fit a lifetime-annuity structure cleanly and recommends engaging EIOPA before any launch. Pensions Act 1990 / IORP II — apply to the ARF/PRSA assets. Revenue (Taxes Consolidation Act 1997) — two treatments need confirmation before any launch: that intra-wrapper premium payments are not themselves distributions, and how the deferred policy is valued within the fund for imputed-distribution purposes. The paper flags both as open questions rather than assuming answers.

None of these contains a launch-blocking provision. The blocker is prudential, not regulatory — see section 9.

8. The first finding — the product works, and is fair to buy

This is the paper's positive result, and it comes in three parts.

It funds itself. Over the contract the pool receives €130,442 in present value and pays €126,529, leaving the intended 3% margin to the cent. Own funds are positive at every date, and at vesting the accumulated fund of €175,975 exceeds the reserve of €169,783. There is no funding deficiency anywhere.

It is genuinely valuable to the consumer. A surviving member's income is worth 24.2% more than their own contribution — funded by the forfeitures of those who die (58.2%) or lapse (41.8%) before vesting. And the secured income beats the best unsecured drawdown alternative at every age it exists to protect:

By age 100 every engineered drawdown strategy has exhausted, and the product's lead is widest exactly where the longevity risk is greatest.

It is fair to buy — on the right distribution structure. Fairness is measured by the money's-worth ratio: the expected value a policyholder receives for each euro of premium, on their own survival basis. The conventional floor for annuity-class products is 0.90. As marketed — with a protection-style 5% trail — the ratio is 0.8952: a narrow fail, because the premium exceeds the maximum fair premium of €12,250.22 by just €65.84 a year. The cause is precisely identified: a distribution loading calibrated to standalone protection business, applied to an option inside an already-remunerated pension wrapper. Re-sizing the commission to a 1% trail restores the ratio to 0.9342 — 3.4 points of headroom — at a capital cost of about €253 per policy. The design itself is fair-capable: at zero commission the ratio is 1.046. So fairness is a structure choice, not a defect — and it is not the reason the product cannot be written. Section 9 is.

9. The second finding — the capital requirement, and why it does not close

This is the material adverse finding. It is not about whether the insurer can meet its promises — it can, and the reserve is funded. It is about the capital a writing office must hold to keep its Solvency II coverage above 100% at every point across the run-off.

The paper poses the question as a single number: the day-one own funds per policy that hold coverage at or above 100% at every valuation date. Computed year by year across the whole run-off — not on a coarse five-year sampling, which misses the peak — the answer is:

€36,779.69 of day-one own funds per policy, binding at year eight of the deferral — seven years before any income is paid.

Set against a lifetime margin of €3,913.27, that is €9.40 of capital for every €1 of margin — about €36.8 million per 1,000 policies behind €12.3 million of annual premium income. More than half of the requirement at inception (€20,767) is the Solvency II risk margin itself — the cost of holding capital is of the same order as the capital.

Why coverage is hard to hold. Premium income runs during the deferral, but the longevity liability keeps building toward the vesting date; the requirement peaks mid-deferral, well before any income is ever paid. And crucially, no available lever closes the gap — and the two main levers oppose each other:

• Re-pricing is blocked in both directions. The fairness floor pins a maximum fair premium; charging more breaches fairness (and the ratio only worsens as the premium rises), while charging less accumulates less capital.
• Cheaper distribution improves fairness but raises the requirement — a smaller premium accumulates less through the deferral. The two constraints that govern the design point in opposite directions.
• Longevity reinsurance does not help. A post-vesting longevity swap cedes the wrong years: the binding point sits inside the deferral, which such a swap cannot reach. At market prices it raises the requirement — €59,179 to €73,065 across an 8–12% cost band — and even a costless, charge-free cession leaves a floor of €27,456.
• Regulatory reform helps most, but not enough. The 2027 Solvency II reform cuts the risk-margin cost-of-capital rate from 6.0% to 4.75%, reducing the requirement to €32,838 — a 10.7% fall — and moving the binding date to year ten. It leaves the requirement at 8.4 times the margin. It does not touch Article 138.

The finding holds across the surface: computed cell by cell for 27 entry-and-vesting combinations, the requirement varies by only a factor of 1.64 per unit of benefit, and the representative case sits a mid-range 10.3% above the panel mean.

The conclusion of the paper is therefore that the product should not be written as designed — not on prudential grounds and not because of any pricing defect, but because the capital required to carry deferred longevity risk under the standard formula cannot be serviced by the margin such a contract can generate.

10. The third finding — the Article 138 longevity calibration

This finding is independent of the product and matters to the wider market. Under Solvency II, an insurer must hold capital against the risk that policyholders live longer than expected. The standard-formula stress for that risk — Article 138 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/35 — prescribes a single test: reduce every mortality rate by a permanent 20% and hold capital equal to the loss.

The paper checks that flat 20% stress against a Cairns–Blake–Dowd (CBD) stochastic mortality model calibrated to the 99.5% percentile — the one-in-two-hundred standard Solvency II targets everywhere else. On the measure that capital is actually set by — applying both stresses to the same liability and comparing the charges:

Article 138 delivers 0.545 of the CBD 99.5% charge at the representative case, and between 0.430 and 0.683 across all 27 panel cells — inadequate in every one.

The reason is that the true stress is age-dependent where the regulation is flat: the stochastic stress implies a mortality ratio running from about 0.93 at age 65 to 0.58 at 100, while Article 138 applies 0.80 at every age — and an annuity liability is concentrated exactly at the ages where the stochastic stress is severe. The flat decrement that would reproduce the stochastic charge for this liability is 33%, not 20%. In life-expectancy terms the 20% stress sits at the 97.9th percentile at age 65, reaching the 99.5% benchmark only at older starting ages.

Why this matters to a consumer: in the short run it does not change any premium, because Article 138 is what the insurer is required to hold. In the longer run, if this finding is taken up by EIOPA or other researchers, it could change how much capital insurers must hold against this class of product — which affects what insurers are willing to offer, and at what price. The paper flags it as a legitimate question for a calibration review of the longevity sub-module for deferred exposures.

11. The forward look — what could change the conclusion

The paper identifies the directions under which a longevity-insurance product for the Irish ARF and vested-PRSA market might, in future work, become viable. None is pursued in v3.1.0; each is substantive subsequent work:

• A group or master-trust chassis, in which the capital sits against a diversified book rather than a single office's balance sheet — for example, diversification against an existing annuity back-book.
• Design variants that shorten the run-off the office holds — fund-linked payouts, or commutation/cash-out options at vesting — each of which would require the consumer-fairness architecture to be rebuilt.
• A deferral-period longevity-reinsurance instrument — cover for the years that actually bind, which the market does not currently write (post-vesting swaps cede the wrong years).
• An internal-model capital treatment replacing the standard-formula gate — though the paper cautions that an internal model faithful to its own benchmark would charge more for longevity, not less, so the infeasibility is not merely formula conservatism.
• Promotion of the Irish-data parallel calibration (Annex A) from benchmark to pricing basis as domestic data matures.
• The 2027 Solvency II reform (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/269), the single largest relief, though on its own it closes only about a tenth of the gap.

The paper's role is to establish the findings and place these directions on record for whoever takes the next step.

12. Who this kind of product might suit — and who it would not

Although the design is not commercially viable on the paper's finding, the underlying consumer need is real. If a future variant became available, the target profile would be broadly as follows.

It might suit someone who is roughly 60–75 and in good health; holds an ARF or vested PRSA large enough that premiums do not compromise income in their sixties and seventies; has a family history of longevity or a specific concern about outliving their fund; understands and accepts that no benefit is paid on death before vesting; and prefers a secured lifetime income for the tail years to a variable drawdown outcome.

It would not suit someone who has no pension fund to pay premiums from and would fund them from after-tax cash; has a materially reduced life expectancy; wants to leave residual pension assets to dependants; wants inflation protection beyond the built-in escalation; or has no stable ARF/PRSA administrator willing to pay premiums to an external insurer.

In every case the decision would require personalised advice from a Central Bank-regulated adviser who has reviewed the person's full financial position. This guide cannot make that decision for anyone.

13. The disclosure framework

If a product of this class were ever brought to market, it would be sold with a formal disclosure pack: a Key Information Document (KID) under PRIIPs; a Product Information Document; a Statement of Suitability; a Terms and Conditions booklet; and a Reasons Why letter under the IDD and the Consumer Protection Code 2025.

Two disclosure points are specific to this design. First, the paper flags that the standard three-scenario PRIIPs performance illustration does not fit a lifetime-annuity structure and recommends engaging EIOPA before any launch. Second — and central — this is a forfeiture contract: the honest frame is the same as term assurance, namely that most purchasers will pay premiums and receive no benefit, and that this is the mechanism by which those who reach vesting are paid. That candour, stated alongside the quantified value the pool returns to survivors, is what a suitable sale would require.

14. A checklist for the informed reader

If you are reading this because you were interested in the product as a consumer, the position is that it is not available and, on the design examined, is not viable to write today. If a future variant appears, the following would apply.

• I have read the full technical paper (MWP-2026-04 v3.1.0), or a summary I trust.
• I understand the product does not currently exist in the Irish market.
• I have an independent, up-to-date valuation of my ARF or vested PRSA.
• I have discussed my longevity assumptions with my family and, if possible, my GP.
• I have consulted a Central Bank-regulated adviser authorised on both insurance and pensions.
• The adviser has explained the commission structure applying to any specific quote.
• I understand that no death benefit is paid if I die before the vesting date.
• I understand the income convention (level or escalating) that applies to any quote.
• I understand that once income starts, I cannot commute or surrender the policy for a lump sum.
• I have received a written Statement of Suitability tailored to my circumstances.
• I have compared at least one alternative — an immediate annuity at vesting, or continued ARF drawdown.

15. Frequently asked questions

Q. Is this product available to buy today in Ireland? A. No. It is a research paper describing a design. No Irish insurer currently sells one, and the v3.1.0 finding is that the design cannot be written on the Solvency II standard formula at a price that is fair to the consumer, because the capital required is out of proportion to the margin the contract generates.

Q. Earlier versions called this an "adverse-finding paper." What changed? A. The framing. Version 3.1.0 is a full rewrite that presents the work as a neutral technical assessment — one positive finding (the product is sound and fair to buy on the right structure) and two adverse ones (the capital requirement, and the Article 138 calibration). The substance of the negative capital finding is unchanged; several figures were refined by an independent audit, recorded in the accompanying erratum.

Q. Some numbers differ from what I read before. Which edition is authoritative? A. v3.1.0 and its companion workbook v14.2.0. Between editions the paper was remodelled and independently audited; several headline figures moved. Earlier editions and their Reader's Guides are superseded.

Q. Who benefits if I die before the vesting date? A. Nobody personally — there is no death benefit. Your premiums are forfeited to the pool and subsidise the members who reach vesting. That forfeiture is how the product is funded.

Q. If the product is "fair to buy," why can't it be sold? A. Because fairness to the buyer and viability to the writer are different questions. The contract is fair on a right-sized commission, but the insurer would have to hold about €36,780 of capital per policy against only €3,913 of margin — capital it cannot recover from the product. It is fair to buy and prohibitive to write.

Q. Is the income inflation-linked? A. In the representative case the income escalates at 2% a year. Any real product would specify its own convention.

Q. Can I have a joint-life version? A. No — the design examined is single-life only. A joint-life extension would be future work.

Q. Does the 2027 Solvency II reform fix it? A. No, not on its own. It reduces the risk-margin cost-of-capital rate from 6.0% to 4.75%, cutting the requirement about 10.7% (to €32,838) and moving the binding point to year ten. It is the largest single relief but leaves the requirement at 8.4 times the margin, and it does not change Article 138.

Q. What would need to change for a product like this to become available? A. At least one of: a group/diversified chassis that changes the capital arithmetic; a design variant that shortens the run-off (fund-linked payouts or a cash-out at vesting); a deferral-period longevity-reinsurance instrument the market does not yet write; an internal-model capital treatment; or further regulatory reform. The paper takes the view that none is on the near-term horizon in the combination required.

Q. What is the Article 138 finding, in one line? A. The standard formula's longevity stress appears to hold only about half the capital a one-in-two-hundred stochastic standard would imply for this kind of deferred longevity risk — a point that applies beyond this product.

16. Glossary of terms

17. About the author

Donal Milmo-Penny, QFA FLIA, is founder of Mylife.ie and Research Lead of the Mylife.ie Working Paper Series. He is a founding partner of SMP Financial Ltd, a Central Bank of Ireland-regulated firm (registration C42382), with twenty-five years in the Irish life-assurance and pensions market. He has served as President and Chairman of the Professional Insurance Brokers Association, as a Director of Brokers Ireland, and as a member and former Chair of Brokers Ireland's Legislation and Compliance Committee.

Mylife.ie is a trading name of SMP Financial Ltd, regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland (C42382).

18. About this paper

Citation. Milmo-Penny, D. (2026). Longevity Insurance — for the Irish ARF and vested PRSA market. Working Paper MWP-2026-04, v3.1.0, July 2026. Mylife.ie.

Edition. The v3.1.0 Complete Edition comprises the paper body with Annex A (stochastic mortality projection pack), Annex B (full pricing and reserving surface), Annex C (primary sources) and Annex D (workbook guide), together with the companion workbook MWP-2026-04_Audit_Workbook_v14.2.0.xlsx (45 sheets, 76,434 formulas, 50 registered figures) and a consolidated erratum recording the independent-audit corrections. Earlier editions and their Reader's Guides are superseded.

Classification. Neutral technical assessment: product-design analysis with quantified reserving and capital assessment. No commercial recommendation is sought or offered.

Remuneration disclosure. This paper is research output, not an advertisement for a product from any insurer. Mylife.ie and SMP Financial Ltd have no commercial arrangement with any manufacturer to develop or distribute the product described.

AI-assisted preparation. The supporting workbook and analysis were assembled with substantial AI-assisted computation and code review, under the author's direction. Every figure in the paper is a live formula in the companion workbook; all outputs were reconciled through an independent computational audit, and every source cited is a primary source. No AI-generated content was accepted without human review by the author.

Copyright. © 2026 SMP Financial Ltd. Mylife.ie is a trading name of SMP Financial Ltd. All rights reserved. This guide may be quoted with attribution. SMP Financial Ltd is regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland (C42382).

Disclaimer

This guide is consumer information published for general educational purposes. It is not personal financial advice, is not a recommendation, and is not a solicitation to buy or sell any financial product. Mylife.ie and SMP Financial Ltd make no warranty as to the accuracy or completeness of the information in this guide and accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of it. Anyone considering a life-insurance or pensions decision should consult a suitably qualified financial adviser authorised by the Central Bank of Ireland.

Tax treatment depends on individual circumstances and may change. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results.

End of Reader's Guide v2.0.0. Prepared July 2026 by Donal Milmo-Penny, QFA FLIA — Research Lead, Mylife.ie · SMP Financial Ltd, Dublin.